The Review of Financial Studies dependent on external finance for their investment needs grow significantly faster following liberalization. And, using lagged values of the global price earnings ratio for each industry to capture growth opportunities (Bekaert et al. 2007) , we find that industries that face better growth opportunities experience significantly higher value-added growth following liberalization. Hence, the industry-level results support the view that liberalization leads to higher growth by reducing financing constraints.
However, the impact of liberalization within industries reveals a puzzle. The increase in value-added growth following a stock market liberalization appears to come from an expansion in the size of existing firms rather than through the entry of new firms at the industry level. This observation holds even for industries that are more dependent on external financing and that face greater growth opportunities. Since new firms are likely to be financially more constrained, this seems to contradict the finding that liberalization facilitates growth by reducing financing constraints. To reconcile these conflicting results, we hypothesize that the differential impact of liberalization on new versus existing firms may be due to institutional and regulatory barriers to entry at the country and industry level.
Investigating barriers to entry at the country level first, we hypothesize that new firms may face higher entry barriers in countries that allocate capital less efficiently because of frictions arising out of institutional quality and regulatory barriers. Using a measure of capital allocative efficiency based on Wurgler (2000) , we find that following liberalization, more externally dependent industries and industries that face better growth opportunities experience an 8.4% and 0.4% higher growth rate, respectively, in the number of establishments if they are located in a country that allocates capital more efficiently. These results imply that a stock market liberalization will facilitate new firm growth if it is accompanied by complementary reforms that improve the allocative efficiency of capital. Second, at the industry level, we investigate whether industries that have natural barriers to entry arising out of technological factors such as economies of scale are differently affected by liberalization. Using U.S. industry concentration ratios to capture natural barriers to entry, we find that less concentrated industries, which have lower entry barriers, grow significantly faster following liberalization.
Third, we focus on the reduction of barriers to entry at the industry level by considering the privatization of government-owned firms. Governmentowned firms are often successful at using their political connections to obtain protection from competition (Chari and Gupta 2008) . By reducing the presence of government-owned firms, privatization may lower the entry barriers for new firms, allowing them to take advantage of lower financing constraints following liberalization. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that following liberalization, industries that privatize government-owned firms experience a 15.6% higher growth in the number of establishments compared to industries that do not privatize.
The Average Effect of Liberalization on Industrial Growth
We start out by investigating the aggregate impact of a stock market liberalization on industry growth by estimating the following panel-data specification with industry-country fixed effects:
Growth i, j,t = β 1 Liberalization j,t + β 2 X i, j,t−1 + β 3 Y ear t + α i, j + i, j,t , (1) where the dependent variables are the growth rates of (1) real value added, (2) establishment size, (3) number of establishments, (4) investment per establishment, (5) average market capitalization, and (6) the level of (log) investment in industry i, country j, and year t; Liberalization is a dummy variable that is equal to one for all years including and after the year of a stock market liberalization; X i, j,t−1 represents lagged values of annual industry-and country-specific factors that may affect growth; Y ear t represents year dummies that capture contemporaneous shocks; and, α i, j represents industry-country fixed effects. Note that Growth in Real Value Added = Log(ValueAdded it /ValueAdded it−1 ), and the other growth rates are similarly constructed. This is a difference in difference approach with a control group in each year that includes those countries in the sample that have either not yet liberalized or never liberalize their stock markets during the sample period. The error term i, j,t , which captures unobservable shocks that affect industry performance, is corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered for each industry and country observation in the fixed effects specifications.
From the results reported in panel A of Table 1 , we note that the real valueadded growth and growth in the average size of establishments increase significantly on average following a stock market liberalization (columns (1) and (3)). The significant increase in the level of investment (column (4)), the growth rates of investment per establishment (column (5)), and average market capitalization (column (6)) suggests that, on average, liberalization reduces the cost of external financing at the industry level. Note that the impact of liberalization on the level of investment is greater than the impact on average size and value-added growth. However, liberalization is not followed by an increase in the growth rate of the number of establishments in an industry (column (2)). Hence, the increase in industry growth occurs mainly through an expansion in the size of existing firms rather than through the entry of new firms at the industry level.
In a country-level study, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) document that the effect of a stock market liberalization on GDP growth is between 1% and 2%, while the preliminary analysis in Table 1 suggests that the impact of liberalization on manufacturing industry growth is considerably higher (column (1)). To reconcile these findings, we conduct additional analyses that suggest that the size of the liberalization effect varies across industries, although its sign and statistical significance are robust to alternative specifications. In particular, results from a robust regression reported in Table 1B and a median regression reported in Appendix Table 2 suggest that liberalization has a smaller but highly significant impact on growth after controlling for the presence of influential observations. 2 In Table 1C , we also report results from a quantile regression indicating that while the liberalization effect varies in magnitude across different percentiles of value-added growth, it is positive and statistically significant for almost the entire distribution from the lowest 1st percentile to the 90th percentile of growth. From a policy perspective, these results suggest that liberalization has a robust positive and significant impact on industry growth that varies in size across industries. This evidence of a heterogeneous liberalization effect further motivates the analysis below where we focus on the cross-sectional impact of liberalization.
In Equation (1), we control for industry-country fixed effects, which would address the endogeneity of the liberalization decision to unobservable industry and country factors that do not change over time. To address endogeneity that may arise if the liberalization decision is based on time-varying unobservable factors, we provide instrumental variable estimates in panel D of Table 1 . We Table 1 The average impact of a stock market liberalization: preliminary results Panel A: Fixed effects regression of the average impact of stock market liberalization use the mean pre-liberalization values of log per capita GDP and the share of international trade in GDP, and the rule of law at the country level as instrumental variables. 3 The first two variables capture initial economic conditions that are likely to influence the likelihood of liberalization, and have been used as an instrument for liberalization reforms by Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) , while the rule-of-law variable has been used as an instrument for financial market development by Claessens and Laeven (2003) . Since the instrumental variables are constant, we do not include fixed effects in the instrumental variable regression. Appendix Table 3A provides pairwise correlations between the instrumental variables, liberalization, and industry growth, which show that none of the instruments is correlated with growth, while all three are significantly correlated with the probability of liberalization. 4 Overall, the instrumental variable results reported in Table 1D are robust to correcting for potential omitted variable bias. The effect of liberalization remains similar with the exception of average market capitalization per firm. Note that results from a Sargan overidentification test reported in panel D indicate that these instruments are valid and are not correlated with any of the dependent variables. The first stage results, with growth in real value added as the dependent variable, are reported in Appendix  Table 3B .
The results in Table 1 suggest that there is a significant increase in industry growth following liberalization but this increase occurs mainly through an increase in the size of existing firms rather than through the entry of new firms. Since new firms are likely to face higher financial constraints, the lack of a significant impact of liberalization on new firm growth seems to contradict the view that stock market liberalizations reduce financing constraints. In the remainder of this paper, we examine the cross-sectional evidence to gain more insight into the impact of liberalization on industry growth.
Hypotheses
In this section, we develop hypotheses examining whether the cross-sectional impact of liberalization is consistent with the country-level evidence that liberalization reduces financing constraints by lowering the cost of external capital (Bekaert and Harvey 2000; Henry 2000a Henry , 2000b , and improving the alignment between capital and growth opportunities (Fisman and Love 2004; Bekaert et al. 2007 ). Our first hypothesis provides a direct test of the argument that a stock market liberalization leads to higher growth by lowering the cost of external capital:
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The Review of Financial Studies The first row in this table reports the mean value of industry characteristics for 31 countries between 1981 and 1998 with standard deviations in parentheses. The remaining rows describe the median, minimum, maximum, 1st percentile (1%), 5th percentile (5%), 95th percentile (95%), and 99th percentile (99%) of each variable for each industry across all sample years and countries. Note that all the growth rates are in logs. The summary statistics are computed for each 3-digit ISIC industry across all available countries and years. The variables are described in Appendix Table 1 .
Hypothesis 1 (External Dependence). If a stock market liberalization lowers the cost of external capital, then industries that depend more on external finance for their investment needs will grow faster following liberalization.
This industry-level hypothesis is motivated by the results in Table 1 , indicating that industry investment and market capitalization increase significantly after liberalization, and evidence at the country level suggesting that liberalization lowers the cost of external capital (Bekaert and Harvey 2000; Henry 2000a Henry , 2000b . It is based on Rajan and Zingales' (1998) results showing that industries that are more dependent on external finance will grow faster in financially developed countries, which have a lower wedge between the cost of external and internal capital. Therefore, if a stock market liberalization lowers the cost of external capital, then more externally dependent industries should grow faster following liberalization.
Our next hypothesis investigates whether liberalization facilitates industry growth by improving the alignment between capital and growth opportunities, as suggested by country-level evidence (Fisman and Love 2004; Bekaert et al. 2007 ). The following hypothesis describes the industry-specific implication:
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The Review of Financial Studies Hypothesis 2 (Growth Opportunity). If a stock market liberalization improves efficiency in capital allocation, then industries with better growth opportunities will grow faster following liberalization.
The differential impact of liberalization on new versus existing firms described in Table 1 may be due to frictions that raise entry barriers for new firms, such as the quality of institutions and regulatory barriers. To capture this, we hypothesize that new firms may face higher entry barriers in countries that allocate capital less efficiently due to the presence of such frictions. Inefficient allocation of capital at the country level may prevent new firms from benefiting from a reduction in the external cost of capital, or an increase in the allocative efficiency of capital following liberalization. The next two hypotheses develop this argument.
Hypothesis 3 (Allocative Efficiency and External Dependence). Following liberalization, industries that depend more on external finance will experience higher new firm growth if they are located in countries that allocate capital more efficiently.
Hypothesis 4 (Allocative Efficiency and Growth Opportunity). Following liberalization, industries with better growth opportunities will experience higher new firm growth if they are located in countries that allocate capital more efficiently.
Considering entry barriers to new firms at the industry level, we examine whether the effect of liberalization varies based on barriers arising out of the technological characteristics of the industry. For example, industries that are highly concentrated because of economies of scale are likely to have high entry barriers. This argument leads to our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 (Concentration). If more concentrated industries have higher barriers to entry, they will experience lower growth compared to less concentrated industries following a stock market liberalization.
Lastly, we consider a reduction of barriers to entry at the industry level by focusing on the privatization of government-owned firms. Governmentowned firms are often more successful than other firms at using their political connections to obtain protection from competition through regulatory barriers (Chari and Gupta 2008) . By reducing the presence of government-owned firms, a complementary privatization program may lower entry barriers for new firms, thereby allowing them to benefit from a stock market liberalization.
Hypothesis 6 (Privatization). If privatized industries have lower barriers to entry, then these industries will grow faster following a stock market liberalization.
Therefore, the growth impact of liberalization may be larger and more uniformly distributed if it is accompanied by complementary reforms that improve the allocation of capital and reduce regulatory barriers to entry. In the next section, we describe the data and variables used to test these hypotheses.
Data
3.1 Data on industries 3.1.1 Industrial growth. Our data cover all emerging markets, based on the International Finance Corporation classification, that liberalized their stock markets after 1980 and for which we observe statistics on industrial growth. Annual data on value-added, investment, and the number of establishments at the three-digit ISIC code level (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities) for each country are obtained from the Industrial Statistics Database compiled by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and data on the market capitalization of all publicly listed firms in a country are from Standard & Poor's Emerging Markets Database. For the latter data, we match the four-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) categories to three-digit ISIC categories and we aggregate market capitalization across firms to obtain market capitalization at the three-digit ISIC industry level.
For each country and each of the 27 three-digit ISIC industrial categories, we use annual values of the level of industry investment, and the growth rates of real value-added, number of establishments, average establishment size, investment per establishment, and average market capitalization per establishment as the dependent variables. Specifically, Growth in Real Value Added = Log(ValueAdded it /ValueAdded it−1 ), and the other growth rates are similarly constructed. We use the log value of the level of annual investment, where Investment is defined as the change in real gross fixed capital formation in an industry. The variables value-added and Investment are deflated using the GDP deflator obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. We also construct the following variables: Size is defined as real value-added divided by the number of establishments in that industry; Investment per establishment is defined as Investment divided by the number of establishments in that industry; and Average Market Capitalization is defined as the market capitalization of all listed firms in an industry divided by the number of establishments. We observe an unbalanced panel of industrial statistics between 1981 and 1998 for the 31 countries in our sample. 5 In Table 2 , we describe the distribution of the industry performance measures for each ISIC industry across the available countries and years.
External finance dependence.
Data on the actual use of external financing at the country and industry level are typically not available for emerging markets. Moreover, the actual level of external financing undertaken by firms will depend on the characteristics of the financial markets in which they operate. Hence, we use an industry's technological dependence on external finance based on Rajan and Zingales (1998), which we denote by External Dependence. Based on the argument that there are technological reasons for differences in industries' dependence on external finance, implying that these differences are likely to persist across countries, Rajan and Zingales (1998) construct measures of external finance dependence using data on listed U.S. firms. Since U.S. capital markets are relatively frictionless, this variable should capture differences in the technological demand for external financing among industries. Thus, the use of external funds by U.S. firms in an industry serves as a proxy for the amount foreign firms in the same industry would raise if their financial markets were as developed as that of the United States. The external finance dependence measure is constructed as the median value of the difference between capital expenditures and cash flow from operations, divided by capital expenditures for U.S. manufacturing firms over 1980 -1989 Compustat data, we construct this measure for three-digit ISIC sectors.
Growth opportunity.
We use the one year lagged value of the annual global price to earnings ratio (Global PE Ratio) from Bekaert et al. (2007) to capture growth opportunities at the industry level. This is a forward-looking measure that captures investors' expectations about an industry's future growth opportunities, and it is calculated for each three-digit ISIC industry in each year between 1980 and 1997. We use the lagged value so as to allow industries to adjust to demand shocks. Unlike the external finance dependence variable, Global PE Ratio varies over time because growth opportunities such as those arising out of global shocks are likely to be temporal. Note that this variable reflects exogenous growth opportunities in the world market for each industry rather than country-specific growth opportunities.
As a robustness check, we also use industry sales growth in U.S. firms to rank industries according to growth opportunities, based on Fisman and Love (2004) . Since capital markets in the U.S. are relatively frictionless, U.S. firms are likely to react optimally to global demand shocks. Note that Fisman and Love's (2004) growth opportunity measure does not vary over time. To capture the effect of global demand shocks, we use Compustat data to construct an annual measure of sales growth in U.S. industries, where annual Sales Growth is the industry median of real sales growth in each year between 1981 and 1998 for 27 three-digit ISIC manufacturing industries. We use the one year lagged value of this variable. From Appendix Table 3C , we note that the correlation between Fisman and Love's (2004) constant sales growth measure, Sales Growth in 1980s, and real value-added industry growth is equal to 0.159 and is not statistically significant, whereas the correlation between annual Sales Growth and value-added growth is equal to 0.329 and is highly significant. Note that the correlations for the time-varying variables, Global PE Ratio and Sales Growth, are obtained from a panel data regression with value-added growth as the dependent variable and controlling for industry-country fixed effects and year dummies, with the error term clustered for each industry-country observation. The correlations for the constant variables, External Dependence and Sales Growth in 1980s, are obtained from pooled regressions with the error term clustered for each industry-country observation.
Concentration.
The concentration variable is constructed using U.S. industry concentration data from the 1992 United States Economic Census available from the U.S. Census Bureau. Since the U.S. is one of the least regulated economies in the world, U.S. industry concentration is likely to most closely reflect technological entry barriers, such as those due to economies of scale. The census data are collected for all establishments in the United States. It is available at the four-digit SIC level, which we then match to three-digit ISIC categories. The variable Concentration is defined as the proportion of output given by the four largest firms in each industry. Higher values of this variable indicate that an industry is more concentrated. Note that the actual industry concentration in each country, even if it were available, may capture regulatory or institutional barriers rather than technological differences across industries.
As a robustness check, we use Firm Size, which measures an industry's technological composition of small firms relative to large firms. This grouping variable is based on Beck et al. (2004) , and is defined as the share of employment in firms with less than 20 employees in each industry. It is constructed using data on the U.S. industries from the 1992 U.S. Economic Census.
Privatization.
We create a new dataset on privatization at the industry and country level, where privatization refers to the sale of government-owned firms to private owners. We document firm-level data on privatization sales in each country between 1990 and 1999 from the World Bank Privatization Transactions Database. We also hand-collect data on pre-1990 privatization transactions for countries that privatized before that year from news and government sources. To create an industry-level database, we classify each firm according to its three-digit ISIC industry code. The variable Privatization is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for all years including and after the year in which a government-owned firm is sold to private owners in a particular industry and country. Note that this variable varies by industry, country, and year. Liberalization year refers to the official year of policy change announced by the government. The start and end dates refer to the sample length of industrial statistics for each country. a country's government to allow foreign investors to purchase shares in the country's stock markets. We follow this convention by selecting the official liberalization date from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) , which refers to the year of a formal regulatory change after which foreign investors officially have the opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities in that country. In the analysis, Liberalization is defined as a dummy variable that is equal to one for all years including and after the year of stock market liberalization. Table 3 reports the stock market liberalization year and the sample period observed for each country.
Allocative efficiency of capital.
We measure the efficiency of capital allocation in each country prior to a stock market liberalization, based on Wurgler (2000) . Specifically, we estimate regressions with investment at the industry level as the dependent variable and growth in real value-added as the right-hand-side variable for each country across all years before liberalization.
The coefficient of value-added growth is the measure of investment value-added elasticity at the country level. Higher values of this variable are associated with more efficient allocation of capital and therefore lower entry barriers for new firms, since it indicates that more investment funds are allocated to growing industries. We define Allocative Efficiency as a dummy variable that is equal to one if the investment-value-added elasticity measure of a country is above the 75th percentile of elasticity for all countries, indicating a country with lower entry barriers.
Control variables.
We control for a range of country-specific factors in the regression analysis that are expected to be related to industry growth. These include the ratio of annual exports and imports to total GDP to control for the effects of trade liberalization and the overall availability of credit in the economy to control for other financial market reforms. Since the impact of liberalization may differ according to country size, we also control for annual per capita real GDP. The literature has found evidence of a significant impact of human capital on growth (King and Levine 1993; Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2005) , so we include the ratio of annual secondary school enrollment to total school enrollment. We may overstate the impact of liberalization if governments time liberalization to coincide with a boom in the world business cycle. To separate business cycle effects and contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks from the liberalization effect, we include the average annual economic growth rate of OECD economies and year dummies in all the regressions. To control for the initial conditions and industrial structure in an economy, all the specifications include the lagged share of each industry's value-added in the total value-added of all industries in that country. We obtain most of the country economic variables from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, with the exception of the ratio of private credit to GDP, which is from Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) . The summary statistics for all the country-level economic variables are reported in Table 4 . As a robustness check, we also control for institutional characteristics at the country level using the Creditor Rights index from La Porta et al. (1998) .
Contemporaneous reforms.
To control for the effect of other economic reforms, we investigate the effects of short-run macroeconomic stabilization programs at the country level. Data on stabilization programs are obtained from Henry (2000a) and Hutchison (2001) . We select only those stabilization dates that are recorded in both sources for the countries in our data. In Appendix Table 1 , we describe the data source and the construction of all the variables used in the analysis.
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Disaggregating the Impact of Stock Market Liberalization on Industry Growth
External dependence and the impact of liberalization
To investigate the impact of a stock market liberalization across industries, we examine whether the cross-sectional impact is consistent with the view that liberalization reduces financing constraints by lowering the cost of external capital and improving the alignment between capital and growth opportunities. In Hypothesis 1, we argue that if liberalization lowers the cost of external capital then it will lead to higher growth in industries that are more dependent on external finance. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following panel data specification with industry-country fixed effects:
where External Dependence captures an industry's technological dependence on external finance, and the remaining variables are as described below Equation (1). 6 This is a difference-in-difference approach with a control group in each year that includes those countries in the sample that either have not yet liberalized or will never liberalize their stock markets during the sample period. Note that in all the regressions here and below, the error term is corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered for each industry-country observation.
The results from estimating Equation (2) are reported in Table 5 , panel A. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that industries that are more dependent on external finance grow significantly faster following liberalization, which suggests that a stock market liberalization facilitates industry growth by reducing the cost of external capital. The coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant at the 5% level with growth in value-added (column (1)) and log investment (column (4)) as the dependent variables. This effect is also economically significant. For example, from the coefficient of the interaction between liberalization and external dependence in column (1), we estimate that on average a stock market liberalization leads to a 1.9 percentage point higher growth in real value-added in the Textiles industry at the 75th percentile of external finance dependence, relative to the Petroleum Refinery industry at the 25th percentile. 7 We report this Differential in Growth in all the tables here and below. These results are robust to controlling for industry-country fixed effects and several industry and country characteristics. Hence, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the disaggregated industry level results suggest that liberalization promotes industry growth by reducing financing constraints. However, note that liberalization does not have a significant impact on the growth rate of the number of establishments in more externally dependent industries.
The results suggest that industry growth is also significantly related to the relative size of the industry, to country-level factors, and to global business cycles. For example, comparing an industry in the 75th percentile of Share of Industry Value Added with a share of 5%, with an industry in the 25th percentile with a share of 0.77%, we note from column (1) that the difference in growth rate of real value-added between these two industries is about 20%. From column (1), we also note that a 1% increase in Openness to Trade and Log Per Capita GDP will be followed by an increase of about 0.2% and 0.32%, respectively, in value-added growth. Lastly, we note that a 1% increase in Private Credit/GDP and OECD Growth would lead to a 0.3% decrease and a 3.3% increase, respectively, in value-added growth.
Growth opportunities and the impact of liberalization
In Hypothesis 2, we argue that if liberalization improves the alignment between capital and growth opportunities, it will lead to higher growth in industries that face better growth opportunities. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following panel data specification with industry-country fixed effects:
where Growth Opportunities is an industry-specific annual variable that captures investors' expectations about an industry's future growth opportunities.
The variable is lagged one year to allow the market to adjust to global industry demand shocks. The results are reported in panel B of Table 5 . Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the industry-level evidence suggests that the allocative efficiency of capital will improve following a stock market liberalization, although the effect is less statistically significant at the 10% level compared to the results in panel A. From the estimated coefficient of the interaction between liberalization and growth opportunities, we estimate that on average a stock market liberalization leads to a 1.8 percentage point higher growth in real value-added in the printing industry at the 75th percentile of growth opportunities before liberalization, relative to the beverages industry at the 25th percentile. The disaggregated industry-level results reveal the complex nature of the growth impact of a stock market liberalization. The cross-industry evidence suggests that liberalization relaxes financing constraints, since more externally dependent industries and industries with better growth opportunities grow significantly faster following liberalization. However, within these industries, liberalization appears to benefit existing firms rather than facilitating the entry of new firms. This suggests that liberalization may not ease access to credit for new firms, which typically face the greatest credit constraints. To reconcile these prima facie conflicting results, we explore whether barriers to entry may prevent new firms from benefiting from a stock market liberalization.
Barriers to entry and the impact of liberalization
We investigate whether the impact of liberalization on industry growth is affected by country-and industry-level barriers that prevent new firm entry following liberalization.
Capital allocative efficiency.
In Hypothesis 3, we argue that new firms will benefit less from a reduction in financing constraints following liberalization if they are located in countries that allocate capital less efficiently because of regulatory barriers and institutional frictions. To investigate this hypothesis, we estimate the following panel data specification with industry-country fixed effects:
where Allocative Efficiency is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for countries that allocate capital more efficiently before liberalization, and the remaining variables are as defined earlier.
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The results reported in panel A of Table 6 confirm Hypothesis 3. From the coefficient of the interaction term β 3 reported in columns (1) and (2), we estimate that compared to a country that allocates capital less efficiently, industries that depend more on external finance will experience an 8.4% higher growth in the number of establishments and a 9.5% higher growth in valueadded following liberalization if they are located in a country that allocates capital more efficiently. This effect is highly statistically significant for both growth in real value-added and growth in the number of establishments at the 5% level.
Next, to investigate Hypothesis 4, that in countries that allocate capital more efficiently, liberalization will lead to new firm growth in industries that face better growth opportunities, we estimate the following panel data specification with industry-country fixed effects: 
where the variables are as described earlier. 10 The results reported in panel B of Table 6 are consistent with Hypothesis 4. The interaction term β 5 is highly statistically significant at the 1% level for growth in the number of establishments, and significant at the 10% level for growth in real value-added and establishment size. From the coefficient of the interaction term β 5 in columns (1) and (2), we estimate that compared to a country that allocates capital less efficiently, industries with better growth opportunities experience a 0.4% higher growth in the number of establishments and a 0.2% higher growth in value-added following liberalization if they are located in a country with more efficient capital allocation.
These results suggest that the reduction in financing constraints due to a stock market liberalization will lead to a larger and more uniformly distributed growth impact if it is accompanied by complementary reforms that increase the allocative efficiency of capital in the country. 
Industry concentration.
From a policy perspective, it is useful to identify industry-level barriers that may affect the cross-sectional impact of liberalization. To investigate Hypothesis 5, that industries that are more concentrated for technological reasons will benefit less from a stock market liberalization, we estimate the following panel data specification with industry-country fixed effects:
where Concentration is defined as the proportion of output produced by the largest four firms in an industry based on U.S. data, and the remaining variables are as defined earlier. 11 The results are reported in Table 7 . Consistent with Hypothesis 5, we note from the negative and statistically significant (at the 10% level) coefficient of the interaction term β 2 that following liberalization, less concentrated industries experience a greater increase in real value-added growth (column (1)). In the last row, we report that on average a stock market liberalization leads to a 3.1 percentage point higher growth in real value-added in industry at the 75th percentile relative to the industry at the 25th percentile of industrial concentration. However, industry concentration does not appear to be significantly related to the other dependent variables. 
Privatization.
Next, we focus on the reduction of barriers to entry at the industry level by considering the privatization of government-owned firms in a particular industry and country. To investigate Hypothesis 6, that liberalization will lead to higher establishment growth in industries that privatize governmentowned firms, we estimate the following panel data specification with industrycountry fixed effects:
where Privatization is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for all years including and after the year in which a government-owned firm in industry i, located in country j, is privatized. The remaining variables are as defined earlier.
The results are reported in Table 8 . Consistent with Hypothesis 6, we find that privatizing government-owned firms will encourage the entry of new firms. The positive and highly statistically significant coefficient of the interaction between Privatization and Liberalization (at the 1% level) suggests that privatizing industries experience a significant increase in both real value-added and establishment growth following liberalization. From the coefficient of the interaction between liberalization and privatization in column (2) of Table 8 , we estimate that among privatizing industries, those located in liberalized countries experience 15.6% higher growth in the number of establishments. Note that value-added growth increases and growth in investment per establishment decreases, which is consistent with the result that growth in the number of establishments in privatizing industries increases following liberalization.
The result that a stock market liberalization does not lead to an increase in new firm growth is puzzling since new firms are likely to be financially more constrained. Disaggregating the effect of liberalization, we find evidence suggesting that other frictions in emerging markets may prevent new firms from benefiting from liberalization. In particular, we find that growth in the number of establishments is higher in more externally dependent industries and in industries that face better growth opportunities following liberalization, if these industries are located in countries that allocate capital more efficiently. We also find that industries with lower structural barriers to entry grow faster following liberalization. Lastly, the results show that liberalization leads to new firm growth in industries that privatize government-owned firms. These results suggest that a stock market liberalization is likely to have a larger and more uniformly distributed growth impact if it is accompanied by complementary reforms that enhance competition and increase efficiency in capital allocation.
Additional robustness checks 4.4.1 Institutional environment.
Since financial market frictions are likely to be lower in countries with better governance mechanisms, the growth impact of a stock market liberalization may depend on country-level governance factors. In panel A of Table 9 , we investigate whether the impact of a stock market liberalization varies based on the protection of creditor rights in the economy. The results show that the growth rate of the number of establishments is higher in countries with better creditor rights, and this effect is more pronounced following liberalization. Consistent with the previous results on barriers to entry, liberalization appears to facilitate higher growth through the establishment of new firms in countries with better creditor rights. We also note that privatization is not a proxy for these institutional factors since the coefficients of both the privatization variable and its interaction with liberalization retain their sign and significance in the regressions.
12 Lastly, we find that industry value-added growth is higher in countries with strong creditor rights, which is consistent with the country-level growth results in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) . Note that in the regressions in Table 9 , panels A-D, we include the full set of control variables used in Equations (1)- (7). We do not report the estimated coefficients of the control variables in Table 9 to save space.
Contemporaneous economic reforms.
Since stock market liberalizations are often part of a larger economic reform program, as a robustness check we also investigate whether we are overstating the growth impact of liberalization because of other economic reforms that are simultaneously implemented. In particular, we control for the effect of short-run macroeconomic stabilization programs by including a dummy variable equal to one in the years in which a country entered into a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund. In panel B of Table 9 , we note that the results for external dependence and privatization remain robust after controlling for the effect of 12 The results for external dependence are also robust to controlling for creditor rights. We do not report these results to save space.
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On the Growth Effect of Stock Market Liberalizations contemporaneous reforms. Undertaking a stabilization program appears to significantly reduce the growth rate of real value-added and average market capitalization in a given year, while industry investment increases following stabilization. However, stabilization programs are also more likely to be implemented during an economic downturn. Note that in all the specifications, we also control for trade liberalization by including openness to trade at the country level, and for other financial market reforms by including the ratio of private credit to GDP. 
Firm size.
We investigate whether liberalization increases economic growth by easing financing constraints for industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms. Small firms may face greater financial constraints because of high information costs for investors. The results reported in panel C of Table 9 show that following liberalization, industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms experience significantly higher growth in real value-added. This is consistent with the results obtained for industry concentration. Also, note that the results for external finance dependence and privatization are robust.
Alternative measure of growth opportunities.
As a robustness check, we use lagged industry sales growth in U.S. firms to rank industries according to growth opportunities, based on Fisman and Love (2004) . The results reported in panel D of Table 9 are similar although less significant than those obtained using the Global PE Ratio in Table 6 . We find that industries that face better growth opportunities experience significantly higher establishment growth 13 Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) also control for contemporaneous reforms as an alternative explanation for the liberalization effect.
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The Review of Financial Studies following liberalization if they are located in countries that allocate capital more efficiently.
Conclusion
Financial market liberalization in developing countries has generated considerable controversy. While one side maintains that financial liberalization sets the stage for more rapid growth (Summers 2000) , the other side argues that it increases the potential for crises and a collapse in growth (Bhagwati 1998) . To gain more insight into this important question of whether stock market liberalization benefits developing countries, we use panel data at the industry level to investigate the cross-sectional impact of liberalization on industry growth in a large sample of emerging markets. We find that liberalization is followed by an increase in industry value-added growth, investment, and average market capitalization, which is consistent with the view that financing constraints are reduced when the stock market is liberalized. However, the increase in industry growth appears to come from an expansion in the size of existing firms, rather than through the entry of new firms into an industry. Since new firms typically face high financial constraints, this seems to contradict the view that liberalization promotes growth by reducing financing constraints. To investigate this puzzle, we examine the cross-sectional and within-industry impact of liberalization. Our results reveal the complex nature of liberalization. While the cross-sectional results support the view that liberalization reduces financing constraints, the within-industry results indicate that establishment growth in these industries does not increase following liberalization.
To reconcile the cross-sectional and within-industry results, we find evidence suggesting that barriers to entry at the industry and country level may prevent new firms from benefiting uniformly from liberalization. The results show that establishment growth is significantly higher in industries that depend more on external finance and industries that face better growth opportunities if these industries are located in countries that allocate capital more efficiently. We also find that barriers to entry at the industry level arising out of technological factors can affect growth. Lastly, the evidence shows that establishment growth is significantly higher in privatizing industries following a stock market liberalization. This finding is consistent with the view that the privatization of government-owned firms reduces entry barriers, thereby allowing new firms to benefit from a stock market liberalization.
The result that the growth impact of stock market liberalization is larger if it is accompanied by competition enhancing reforms implies that the issue of complementarities in financial reforms deserves further research. Complementarities were shown to be a crucial aspect of economic reforms in transition economies (e.g., price liberalization and ownership reform; see Roland 2000) , and may be similarly important in financial market reforms in developing countries. 
Compustat
Growth in Real ValueAdded
Annual change in real value added in each ISIC industry in each country.
Industrial Statistics Database, UNIDO Growth in Number of Establishments
Annual change in the number of establishments in each ISIC industry in each country.
Same as above
Growth in Establishment Size
Annual change in ratio of real value added to the number of establishments in each ISIC industry in each country.
Same as above
Investment
Annual fixed capital formation in each ISIC industry in each country.
Same as above
Growth in Investment/ Establishment
Annual change in Investment divided by the number of establishments in each three-digit ISIC industry in each country.
Same as above
Growth in Average Market Capitalization
Annual change in the total market capitalization of all listed firms divided by the number of establishments in each ISIC industry in each country.
S& P Emerging Markets Database
Concentration Proportion of output produced by the largest four firms in each three-digit ISIC industry in the United States.
United States Economic Census
Firm Size Share of employment in firms with less than 20 employees in each three-digit ISIC industry in the United States.
Same as above
Privatization
Annual industry-country variable equal to one including and after the year in which a governmentowned firm in an industry and country is sold to private owners.
World Bank Privatization
Transactions Database (1989 Database ( -1998 ; news sources; government reports.
Share in Industry ValueAdded
Ratio of value added in each industry to total value added of all industries in a country.
Industrial Statistics Database, UNIDO
Country Variables Definition Source
Country Indicators Annual ratio of export and imports to GDP; Annual per capita real GDP; Annual ratio of secondary school enrollment to total enrollment; Annual ratio of private credit to GDP.
World Development Indicators and Beck, Levine, Loayza (2000) for Private Credit
Liberalization
Variable equal to one in all years including and after a stock market liberalization, which is defined as the year of a formal regulatory change after which foreign investors officially have the opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities.
Kim and Singal (1989); Bekaert and Harvey (2000) ; Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002b) ; IFC.
Allocative Efficiency
Variable equal to one if the investment-value added elasticity measure of a country is above the 75th percentile across all countries, indicating a country that allocates capital more efficiently.
Industrial Statistics Database, UNIDO Stabilization
Variable equal to one for the years in which a country entered into a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund. Henry (2000b) and Hutchison (2001) Rule of Law Rule of Law is an index from 0 to 10 measuring the law and order situation.
La Porta et al. (1997) and (1999) Creditor Rights An annual index aggregating creditor rights The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and is constructed as of January for every year from 1978 to 2003.
La Porta et al. (1998) Table 3A reports correlations between liberalization, industry growth, and the instrumental variables. The correlations with liberalization are coefficients from univariate cross-sectional probit regressions with the error term clustered for each industry-country observation, while the correlations with value-added growth are obtained from pooled regressions with the error term clustered for each industry-country observation. Table 3B reports the first stage results from the IV regression in Table 1D with Growth in Real Value-Added as the dependent variable.
p-values and standard errors are in parentheses. Table 3C reports correlations between external dependence, growth opportunities, and industrial growth. The correlations for the time-varying variables are obtained from a panel data regression with industry-country fixed effects and year dummies and with the error term clustered for each industry-country observation. The correlations for the constant variables are obtained from pooled regressions with the error term clustered for each industry-country observation. Notes: * * * , * * , and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels, respectively.
